Distributed Rumor Blocking with Multiple Positive Cascades by Tong, Guangmo Amo et al.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 13, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2014 i
Distributed Rumor Blocking with
Multiple Positive Cascades
Guangmo (Amo) Tong, Student Member, IEEE, Weili Wu, Member, IEEE, and Ding-Zhu Du,
Abstract—Misinformation and rumor can spread rapidly and
widely through online social networks and therefore rumor
controlling has become a critical issue. It is often assumed that
there is a single authority whose goal is to minimize the spread of
rumor by generating a positive cascade. In this paper, we study a
more realistic scenario when there are multiple positive cascades
generated by different agents. For the multiple-cascade diffusion,
we propose the P2P independent cascade (PIC) model for private
social communications. The main part of this paper is an analysis
of the rumor blocking effect (i.e. the number of the users
activated by rumor) when the agents non-cooperatively generate
the positive cascades. We show that the rumor blocking effect
provided by the Nash equilibrium will not be arbitrarily worse
even if the positive cascades are generated non-cooperatively.
In addition, we give a discussion on how the cascade priority
and activation order affect the rumor blocking problem. We
experimentally examine the Nash equilibrium of the proposed
games by simulations done on real social network structures.
Index Terms—Rumor blocking, game theory, social network.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the recent advancements of information technolo-gies, social networks have significantly changed the
world by allowing efficient interchange of ideas and innova-
tions. Especially in online social networks of which there is a
drastic usage in the past decade, the hitting news may break out
even before officially announced [1]. However, misinformation
or rumor also spreads through the network [2], which may
lead serious public panic or economic consequence. Therefore,
rumor control has become one of the important issues in social
networks research.
The topics regarding rumor control are closely related to
the study of influence diffusion in social networks. In a social
network, it is assumed that information spreads in the fashion
of influence cascades. Under the classic models, a cascade
starts to spread from a set of seed users and then propagates
from active users to inactive users. Rumor is taken as a certain
cascade spreading along with other cascades, and the cascades
holding opposite opinions may compete against each other. In
particular, a user who has received the genuine news will not
accept the rumor. Conversely, when rumor comes first, the
undesirable effect can be caused immediately and therefore
the true fact arriving later is futile. For example, when affected
by the misinformation of swine flu on Twitter, people might
have taken mistake vaccines before receiving the clarification
from WHO. In order to prevent people from being misled by
rumor, a natural method is to introduce a positive cascade
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that is able to reach users before the arrival of rumor. Once
the rumor is detected, the network manager can generate
a competing positive cascade by selecting appropriate seed
users such that the number of rumor-activated users can be
minimized. Motivated by this framework, several works (e.g.,
[3]–[6]) have studied the rumor blocking problem under the
competitive diffusion models.
The feasibility of the existing work is limited by the
following aspects. On one hand, due to the great magnitude
of a social network, the whole network cannot be efficiently
controlled by a single manager. In a more realistic scenario,
there are usually more than one positive cascades generated by
different users or institutes which we call the agents. Although
all fight against rumor, when designing rumor containment
strategies, such agents do not cooperate with each other. In
this case, the rumor blocking task is distributed to the agents.
Specifically, each agent makes their own choice according to
the actions of other agents such that their own utility can be
maximized, which forms a game between the agents. Under
this setting, the social objective is to minimize the number of
rumor-activated users while the private utility of each agent
varies under different games. In this paper, we study such
a non-cooperative rumor blocking game and investigate the
problem that how bad can the equilibrium of the game be in
the worst-case compared with the optimal seeding strategy,
with respect to the number of non-rumor-activated nodes.
By extending the classic independent cascade model, we
herein develop the peer-to-peer independent cascade (PIC)
model supporting the multiple-cascade diffusion. Unlike the
existing models, the PIC model assumes that an active user
can only activate one inactive neighbor at each time step. The
PIC model represents the private social communication where
the content is not open to all the users in the network. One
example is the mobile social network where the communi-
cation is established by mobile phones in a person-to-person
manner. Based on the PIC model, we formulate the rumor
blocking game with one cascade of rumor and k agents where
each agent generates one positive cascade. In such a game, the
social utility is the number of rumor-activated nodes, which is
a function over the strategy space of the agents. In this paper,
we first show that under the PIC model the social utility is a set
function of the union of the seed sets of the positive cascades,
and furthermore, it is monotone increasing and submodular.
For the private utility, we consider two games, the rumor-aware
game and the rumor-oblivious game, depending on whether
or not the agents are able to distinguish the rumor from the
genuine news. For the proposed games, we provide an analysis
of the equilibrium under the best-response assumption and
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the approximate-response assumption, respectively. Under the
former, the agents are able to make optimal decisions and
the equilibrium of the game provides a 2-approximation with
respect to the social utility. In another issue, we consider
that case that the agents cannot obtain the optimal strategy
in polynomial time due to the NP-hard nature of the problem.
As shown later, the private utility is submodular and it is well-
known that the submodular maximization problem admits an
efficient (1 − 1/e)-approximation. Assuming that the agents
adopt such an approximation strategy, we prove that the
equilibrium of the rumor blocking game provides a 2e−1e−1 -
approximation. We simulate the rumor blocking game on
graphs extracted from real-world social networks and record
the number of nodes influenced by rumor. The experimental
results have shown that the effect of non-cooperative rumor
blocking game is comparable to that of the single-positive-
cascade case when the seed nodes are selected by the state-
of-the-art algorithms.
In addition to the game-theoretic analysis, we further dis-
cuss the property of the completive diffusion models. When
developing such kind of models, there are two critical settings.
One is to determine which cascade should a user u select when
multiple cascades reach u at the same time. Another one is
the order of activation. That is, when a node becomes active,
which of its neighbor will be firstly selected for activation. The
activation order of the neighbors plays an important role in the
diffusion of multiple cascades because the node is activated
by the first cascade reaching it. As discussed later in Sec.
V, such issues become tricky and complicated when there are
more than two cascades. For example, under certain reasonable
settings, when more positive cascades appear in the network,
the rumor may paradoxically spread more widely1. In this pa-
per, we will discuss such issues and provide several interesting
observations on the property of competitive diffusion model.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper is summarized
as follows.
• We propose a new competitive cascade model which rep-
resents the private peer-to-peer communication in social
systems.
• We formulate the rumor blocking game and provide the
analysis of the equilibrium regarding the effect of rumor
blocking. The main result is that the rumor blocking effect
can be guaranteed with a provable ratio even if the agents
work non-cooperatively.
• We discuss the property of the competitive cascade model
under different settings of cascade priority and activation
order.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sec. II we survey the related work. In Sec. III, we provide
the preliminaries and formulate the PIC model. A game-
theoretic analysis is given in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, we discuss
the property of the competitive cascade model under different
settings. The experimental results are shown in Sec. VI. Sec.
VII concludes. Most of the proofs are given in Appendix A.
1As discussed in prior works e.g. [4] and [7], such issues become less
important for the classic IC model because the influence spreads from one
active node to all of their neighbors simultaneously.
II. RELATED WORK
Rumor control has drawn significant attention from both
academia and industry. In what follows, we briefly introduce
the prior works related to this topic.
Rumor detection aims to distinguish rumor from genuine
news. Leskovec et al. [8] develop a framework for tracking
the spread of misinformation and observe a set of persistent
temporal patterns in the news cycle. Ratkiewicz et al. [9] build
a machine learning framework to detect the early stages of
viral spreading of political misinformation. In [10], Qazvinian
et al. address this problem by exploring the effectiveness of
three categories of features: content-based, network-based, and
microblog-specific memes. Takahashi et al. later [11] study
the characteristics of rumor and design a system to detect the
rumor on Twitter.
Rumor source detection is another important problem for
rumor control. The prior works primarily focus on the classic
susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model where the nodes
can be infected by rumor and may recover later. Shah et al.
[12] provide a systematic study and design a rumor source
estimator based on the concept of rumor centrality. Z. Wang
et al. [13] later study this problem with the consideration of
multiple observations.
The rumor blocking problem is mainly considered under the
influence-propagation models. The study of influence diffusion
can be tracked back to Domingos et al. [14]. Later in the sem-
inal work of Kempe et al. [15], two basic operational models,
Independent Cascade model (IC) and Linear Threshold model
(LT), are proposed. Based on those models, advanced models
supporting multiple cascades are then developed and the com-
petitive influence diffusion problem has been studied in such
models. Bharathi et al. [16] show a (1− 1/e)-approximation
algorithm for the best response to an opponent’s strategy.
Borodin et al. [17] study several competitive diffusion models
by extending of the classic LT model and show that the original
greedy approach proposed in [15] may not be applicable to
such settings. The rumor blocking problem is similar but not
identical to the competitive influence maximization problem.
The goal of the competitive influence maximization problem
is to maximize the spread of a certain cascade while rumor
blocking aims to minimize the spread of rumor (i.e. minimize
the number of rumor-activated nodes). For the rumor blocking
problem, Xinran et al. [5] show a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
algorithm for the competitive Linear Threshold Model, and,
Lidan et al. [3] study this problem under the OPOAO model
and DOAM model. From another perspective, Nguyen et al.
[1] propose the βIT -Node Protector problem which limits the
spread of misinformation by blocking the high influential
nodes. Z. He et al. [18] study the rumor blocking problem in
mobile social networks. The above works all aim to design
seeding algorithms, which is essentially different from the
topic of this paper.
We are not the first who study the influence diffusion via
game theoretical approaches. Kostka et al. [19] formulate the
seeding process as a game and study the best-response strategy
under a new model which is more restricted than the IC and LT
model. Different from that paper, we do not design response
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Fig. 1: An illustrative example of BIC and PIC models.
strategies and instead our analysis focuses on the equilibrium
of the game where there is one rumor cascade and multiple
positive cascades. In another issue, C. Jiang et al. in [20], [21]
propose an evolutionary game theoretic framework to model
the dynamic information diffusion process in social networks.
III. MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model and provide
the preliminaries. The notations that are frequently used in this
paper are listed in Table I.
A. Influence Diffusion
1) Single Cascade: A social network is given by a directed
graph G = (V,E) where V and E denote the users and social
ties, respectively. Let Nu = {v|(u, v) ∈ E} be the set of
the out-neighbors of node u and define du = |Nu| as the
number of the out-neighbors of u. We will use terms user and
node interchangeably. We speak of each user as being active
and inactive. To trigger the spread of influence, some users
are firstly activated as seed users who will later attempt to
activate their out-neighbors. Under the independent cascade
model, associated with each edge (u, v) there is a propagation
probability pG(u,v) ∈ [0, 1] which is the probability that u
successfully activates v. For each pair of nodes u and v, u
has only one chance to activate v. By the fashions of influence
propagation, the independent cascade model can be classified
into the following two categories.
Broadcast Independent Cascade (BIC) model.2 Under
this model, when node u becomes active at time t − 1, it
attempt to activates all of its out-neighbors simultaneously at
time step t.
P2P Independent Cascade (PIC) model. Under this
model, an active node u can only attempt to activate one of
its out-neighbors at a time step.
Example 1. An illustrative example of the above two models
is shown in Fig. 1. Suppose the propagation probability of
each edge is 1 and node v3 is selected as the seed node. As
shown in the figures, after the first step, all the neighbors of v3
are activated under the BIC model, while only one neighbor
of v3 is activated under the PIC model.
2This is the model that has been considered in most of the prior works
[15], [22]–[24].
Symbol Definition
G = (V,E) a PIC network.
Nu the set of out-neighbors of node u.
pG(u,v) propagation probability of edge (u, v).
Cr the cascade of rumor.
ar the seed set of rumor.
btu the neighbors of u that can be activated
by u at time step t.
Pr[g] the probability that the realization g can
be generated.
G the set of all possible realizations.
k the number of agents.
Ci the positive cascade generated by the i-th
agent.
ai the seed set of cascade Ci.
Bi the budget of the seed set of cascade Ci.
γ() social utility of the game.
δi() private utility of the i-th agent.
σi(S) the expected number of Ci-active nodes
under strategy S.
tgA(u) the activation time of node u in g under
the full-action A.
TABLE I: Notations.
The BIC model represents the open social communication
namely Facebook or Twitter. For example, a public post on
Facebook is simultaneously available to all the user’s friends.
The PIC model represents the private social communication
such as personal online message or email, where a user has
to take an action to pass the message to their friends. Note
that, for the rumor blocking problem, there is a significant
difference between these two models. One can see that the
PIC model tends to slow the spread of influence, and when
multiple cascades exist whether a node will be rumor-activated
depends on the first cascade reaching it. In this paper, we focus
on the PIC model which has not been studied in the literature.
2) Multiple Cascade: Suppose there are multiple cascades
each of which is generated by its own seed set. We denote by
Cr the cascade generated by rumor with a fixed seed set ar.
The basic definitions are shown as follows.
Definition 1. For a certain cascade C, we call a node C-
active (resp. C-active) if it is activated (resp. not activated) by
cascade C.
Definition 2 (Cascade Priority). Each cascade is assigned a
distinct priority and we assume that the rumor always has
the highest priority. We denote by Priority(C) the priority of
cascade C and, for two cascades C1 and C2, Priority(C1) <
Priority(C2) if and only if cascade C2 has a higher priority
than that of cascade C1.
Definition 3 (Activation Order). Let btu be the set of the node
v such that v ∈ Nu and u has not tried to activate v before
time t. At time step t, an active node u will uniformly at
random select a node in btu to activate
3.
3Other kinds of activation orders will be discussed later in Sec. V.
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Algorithm 1 Realization Generation
1: Input: A PIC network G = (V,E).
2: Output: A realization g = (Vg, Eg) together with αgu for each
node u and pge for each e.
3: Vg ← V and Eg ← E;
4: for each edge e ∈ E do
5: rand← a random number from 0 to 1 generated in uniform;
6: if rand ≤ pGe then
7: pge ← 1;
8: else
9: pge ← 0;
10: for each node u ∈ V do
11: αgu ← a permutation of Nu generated uniformly at random;
12: Return g, pge and αgu;
Recall that the PIC model represents the private commu-
nication and consequently a user cannot know whether the
other users have been activated or not. Therefore, one user
may attempt to activate another user who has already been
activated by others.
3) Diffusion Process: Given a PIC network G and the seed
sets of the cascades, the diffusion process unfolds in discrete,
as described in following.
• Time step 0. Each cascade C activates its seed nodes. If
one node is selected by more than one cascades, it will
be activated by the cascade with the highest priority.
• Time step t > 0. Each active node u randomly select one
node v in btu and activates v with a success probability
of pG(u,v), where each node in b
t
u has the same probability
to be selected by u. If u is C-active and u successfully
activates v then v becomes C-active. If a node is suc-
cessfully activated by two or more neighbors pertaining
to different cascades, it will be activated by the cascade
with the highest priority.
The PIC model is a probabilistic model where the ran-
domness comes from that (a) at each step who to select to
activate and (b) whether the activation succeeds. The following
definition shows a derandomization of the diffusion process
under the PIC model.
Definition 4 (Realization). A realization [25] g = (Vg, Eg) of
a PIC network G = (V,E) is a special PIC network randomly
constructed by Algorithm 1. First, Vg = V and Eg = E.
The propagation probability pge of each edge e in g is either
0 or 1 determined in random. In particular, for each edge e,
the probability that pge = 1 (resp. p
g
e = 0) is p
G
e (resp. 1 −
pGe ). Each node u randomly decides a permutation α
g
u (i.e., an
order) of all its out-neighbors Nu in G where each possible
permutation of Nu has the same probability to be selected by
u. We take a permutation αgu as a one-to-one mapping from Nu
to {1, ..., |Nu|}. In g, the activation order of the our-neighbors
of u is determined by the permutation αgu. That is, when u
becomes active, u selects its neighbor to activate one by one
according to the order given by αgu. The cascade priority in
g remains the same as that in G. Furthermore, we assign a
weight of each edge in g. Suppose u has du out-neighbors
v1, ..., vdu in G. For 1 ≤ i ≤ du, the weight wg(u, vi) of edge
(u, vi) is j in g if αgu(vi) = j. For two nodes u and v, let
disg(u, v) be the length of the shortest path from u to v in
g. For a node set V
′
and a node v, define that disg(V
′
, v) =
minu∈V ′dis
g(u, v). For a certain realization g, let Pr[g] be the
probability that g can be generated by Algorithm 1. Let G be
the set of all possible realizations.
One can see that each realization g corresponds to a basic
event of the PIC model. If an edge (u, v) has a probability
of 1 in g, then it means u can successfully activate v. The
weight wg(u, v) of an edge (u, v) implies that if u is activated
at time t then it will try to activate v at time t + wg(u, v).
The following theorem shows the relationship between a PIC
network and its realizations.
Theorem 1. Given the seed set of each cascade, the following
two diffusion processes are the equivalent to each other, with
respect to the distribution of the spreading results.
• a. Execute the stochastic diffusion process on the PIC
network G.
• b. Randomly generate a realization g of G according
to Algorithm 1, and execute the deterministic diffusion
process on g.
Proof. See appendix A-A.
In the next section, we will discuss the property of the rumor
blocking game where Theorem 1 plays an important role.
IV. A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We assume each cascade is generated by an agent who
decides the seed set of that cascade. For example, an agent
can be a company that posts an advertisement for its product.
In the traditional rumor blocking problem, it is assumed that
there is an authority who generates a single positive cascade.
However, the real social networks are extremely large and such
an authority is not efficient and sometimes even unfeasible. In
this section, we consider the scenario that there are multiple
positive cascades generated by different agents and each agent
aims to limit the spread of rumor by itself, which forms a game
between the agents.
A. Some Notations
Suppose there are k positive cascades {C1, ..., Ck} gener-
ated by k agents, respectively. Together with the rumor Cr
there are totally k + 1 cascades in the network.
Definition 5 (Action Space). Associated with each agent, there
is an action space which is a collection of seed sets that they
can select. We denote by Ai the action space of the i-th agent.
Ai is usually not equal to 2V . For example, a company can
only convince the users who like the product to be the seed
users. The most considered constraint is the budget constraint
where each agent can select at most a certain number of seed
nodes.
Definition 6 (Full-action). A full-action A = (a1, ..., ak) ∈
A1 × A2 × ... × Ak specifies the seed sets selected by the
agents.
Instead of taking a single action from the action space, an
agent may decide an action according to a distribution s over
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all of their actions. We called such a distribution s as a strategy
and denote by Si the set of all strategies of the i-th agent.
Definition 7 (Strategy Space). The strategy space Si of the
i-th agent is a set of the distributions over the actions in Ai.
For each s ∈ Si and a ∈ Ai, we use Pr[a|s] to denote the
probability that action a is taken under the strategy s. We
denote by ∅ the empty strategy where Pr[a|∅] = 0 for each
action a.
In analogy with Def. 6, we have the following term for
strategies.
Definition 8 (Full-strategy). A full-strategy S = (s1, ..., sk) ∈
S1×S2× ...×Sk specifies the strategy adopted by each agent,
where si is the strategy adopted by the i-th agent. For a full-
strategy S and a full-action A, let Pr[A|S] be the probability
that A is implemented under S.
B. Social Utility
For the rumor blocking game, the social utility is the number
of the users that are not activated by rumor.
Definition 9 (Social Utility). For a full-strategy S of the
agents, we use γ(S) to denote the expected number of Cr-
active nodes.
We are particularly interested in the marginal return of γ(S)
resulted by adding more agents to game. For the purpose of
analysis, we introduce the following notations.
Definition 10. For a full-strategy S = (s1, ..., sk), a full-
action A = (a1, ..., ak) and an integer i ≤ k, let Si =
(s1, ..., si, ∅, ..., ∅) and Ai = (a1, ..., ai, ∅, ..., ∅). For a full-
action A = (a1, ..., ak), we denote by A(i, a
′
i) the full-action
where the i-th agent replaces its action ai in A by a
′
i. Similarly
we have the notation S(i, s
′
i) for a full-strategy S and a
strategy s
′
i of the i-th agent.
Intuitively, for i ≤ j, γ(Si(j, s)) − γ(Si) denotes the
marginal return when the j-th agent join the game with a
strategy s. The following result indicates that the social utility
of our rumor blocking game has the property of diminishing
marginal return.
Theorem 2. γ(Si1(i3, s∗)) − γ(Si1) ≥ γ(Si2(i3, s∗)) −
γ(Si2), for 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ i3 ≤ k and any strategy s∗ ∈ Si3 .
The Proof of Theorem 2. In the rest of this section, we
provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2. The details can
be found in the appendix.
For a full-action A = (a1, ..., ak), let γ(A) be the expected
number of Cr-active nodes under A. For a full-action A =
(a1, ..., ak) and a realization g, let γg(A) be the number of
Cr-active nodes in g under A. By Theorem 1,
γ(A) =
∑
g∈G
Pr[g] · γg(A)
The key to proving Theorem 2 is that γ(A) only depends
on the union of the actions in A, shown as follows.
Lemma 1. For a full-action A = (a1, ..., ak), let A∗ = a1 ∪
a2 ∪ ...∪ ak be the union of the seed sets of the agents. γ(A)
is a set function on A∗. That is, for any two full actions A1
and A2, γ(A1) = γ(A2) if A∗1 = A
∗
2.
Proof. See Appendix A-B.
It is worthy to note that in some other models γ() may not
be a set function of the union of positive seed sets, as discussed
in Sec. V. Since γ() is a set function, for any X ⊆ V , let
γg(X) be the number of Cr-active nodes in g when the union
of the seed sets of positive cascades is X .
A set function f : 2V → R is called monotone increasing if
f(X) ≤ f(Y ) for any X ⊆ Y . A set function f : 2V → R is
called submodular if f(X) + f(Y ) ≥ f(X ∩ Y ) + f(X ∪ Y )
for any X and Y ∈ 2V .
Lemma 2. γ() is monotone increasing and submodular.
Proof. See Appendix A-C.
By Lemma 2, γ(Ai1(i3, a)) − γ(Ai1) ≥ γ(Ai2(i3, a)) −
γ(Ai2), for any full-action A, 1 ≤ ii ≤ i2 ≤ i3 ≤ k and
a ∈ Ai3 . Since γ(S) =
∑
A Pr[A|S]·γ(A), Theorem 2 follows
immediately.
C. Private Utility and the Nash Equilibrium
Now let us consider the private utility of the games. We
consider two games depending on whether or not the agents
are able to distinguish rumor from other positive cascades.
1) Rumor-aware Game: In a social network, the agents are
able to identify the rumor when content of rumor is completely
different from the facts. Assuming the agents are aware of the
rumor, the private utility δi() of the i-th agent is
δi(S) = γ(S)− γ(S(i, ∅)), (1)
which is the effort made by the i-th agent to limit the spread of
rumor. For a full-action A, we use δi(A) = γ(A)−γ(A(i, ∅))
to denote the private utility of the i-th agent under A. We term
this game as the rumor-aware game.
Since the agents aim to maximize δi() and the rumor has the
highest priority, we can assume ai ∩ ar = ∅ for any ai ∈ Ai
without loss of generality.
An agent may change their strategy to gain more private
utilities according to the strategies of other agents. For a full-
strategy S, it reaches the Nash equilibrium if no player can
gain more utility by changing their own strategy. That is,
δi(S) ≥ δi(S(i, s′i))
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and each s′i in Si. Due to Nash [26],
the finite k-agent non-cooperative game always has at least
one Nash equilibrium. In the following, we will show that
any Nash equilibrium of the rumor-aware game guarantees
the social utility with a provable ratio compared to the optimal
strategy.
A game is a valid utility system if, under any full-strategy
S, (a) the private utility is not less than the marginal social
utility and (b) the total private utility is not larger than the
social utility. That is
δi(S) ≥ γ(S)− γ(S(i, ∅)) (2)
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for each i, and
k∑
i=1
δi(S) ≤ γ(S) (3)
Theorem 3. The rumor-aware game is a valid utility system
under the PIC model.
Proof. See Appendix A-E.
According to Vetta [27], if the social utility is a submodular
set function, the Nash equilibrium of the game guarantees
the social utility by a factor of 2, and therefore we have the
following result immediately.
Corollary 1. Suppose a full-strategy S forms a Nash equilib-
rium of the rumor-aware game, and let Ω be the full-strategy
such that γ(Ω) is maximized. Then, γ(S) ≥ ( 12 ) · γ(Ω).
Recall that in the rumor-aware game the social utility is
the expected number of Cr-active nodes while the private
utility is the effort made by each agent to limit the spread of
rumor. Due to the nature of non-cooperation, each agent only
concerns their marginal contribution. Nevertheless, Corollary
1 shows that the social utility will not be arbitrarily far
from the optimal and in fact it guarantees a 2-approximation.
Intuitively speaking, even if there is no powerful authority
dealing with rumor in a social network, the rumor can be
efficiently blocked by the users who participate and propagate
positive information.
A pure full-strategy is a special full-strategy where each
the i-th agent decides to carry out one specific action. When
a full-strategy S = (s1, ..., sk) is pure, each si is a vector of 0
and 1. In other words, the pure full-strategy reduces to the full-
action. The Nash equilibrium formed by a pure full-strategy is
called pure Nash equilibrium. Note that there always exists an
optimal strategy Ω which is pure. For general games, the Nash
equilibrium may not be pure. However, the agents usually
make pure strategies instead of making decisions according
to a distribution. The following result shows that for the pure
Nash equilibrium always exists in the rumor-aware game.
Theorem 4. For the rumor-aware game, there exists a full-
action Φ such that δi(Φ) ≥ δi(Φ(i, a′i)) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and each action a
′
i of the i-th agent.
Proof. Let Φ0 be an arbitrary full-action and consider the fol-
lowing process to generate a series of full-actions Φ0, ...,Φm.
For the full-action Φj , if for some i there exists an action
ai ∈ Ai such that δi(Φj) < δi(Φj(i, ai)), we denote Φ(i, ai)
as Φj+1. By such process, we finally obtain a sequence of
full-actions Φj . According to the construction, for any Φj and
Φj+1, there exists some i such that δi(Φj) < δi(Φj+1), which
implies γ(Φj) < γ(Φj+1). Therefore, any two full-actions in
the sequence cannot be identical. Since the action space is
finite, the sequence Φj must be finite and the last full-action
reaches the pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 4 implies that we can build a Nash
equilibrium starting from any full-action by increasing the
private utility of some agent.
The Simple Game. In the prior works, the goal is to
block the rumor by introducing a competing cascade. Due
Algorithm 2 Simple Game
1: A← (∅, ..., ∅);
2: sign← true;
3: while A
′ 6= A do
4: A← A′ ;
5: for i = 1 : k do
6: v ← arg maxv∈V δi(A(i, {v}));
7: A
′ ← A(i, {v});
8: Return A;
to the expense of activating seed nodes, there is a budget
of the seed nodes. In our rumor blocking game, such a
budget is distributed to multiple agents. Suppose the budget is
distributed to k agents where each agent has one budget, the
agents make decisions in turn, and, the agents always make
pure decisions. The evolution of the Nash equilibrium is shown
in Algorithm 2. We denote the game under such a setting as
Simple Game.
Under the budget constraint. The result shown in Corol-
lary 1 requires that each agent follows the best response
policy. However, the agent in real case may not be able to
efficiently4 find such an optimal action that maximizes the
private utility. Under the budget constraint, each agent can
select at most a certain number of seed nodes. In this case,
finding the bests response is NP-hard [4] so the polynomial
approximation response is the best that each agent can adopt.
According to Lemma 2, given the seed sets of other agents,
δi() is also monotone increasing and submodular, and there-
fore the i-th agent can easily obtain an action ai such that
γ(A(i, ai)) ≥ (1 − e−1) · γ(A(i, a∗i ), where a∗i is the best
response [28]. If all the agents adopt the approximation action,
the game finally reaches an approximate Nash equilibrium.
The next result shows that such an equilibrium guarantees the
social utility within a factor of 2e+1e+1 .
Lemma 3. Let A = (a1, ..., ak) be a pure Nash equilibrium
under the approximate response. Then γ(A∗ ∪ Ω∗) ≤ 2e+1e+1 ·
γ(A∗) where Ω is the optimal pure full-action that maximizes
γ().
Proof. See Appendix A-D.
Theorem 5. If each agent adopts the (1− e−1)-approximate
response, the Nash equilibrium guarantees an 2·e−1e−1 -
approximation with respect of the expected number of Cr-
active nodes.
Proof. Since γ() is a set function and γ(Ω∗) ≤ γ(A∗ ∪ Ω∗),
the theorem directly follows from Lemma 3.
2) Rumor-oblivious Game: In another issue, the rumor may
be well disguised such that they cannot be distinguished from
the genuine news. In this case, the best that an agent can do
is to maximize the spread of its own cascade. Therefore, the
private utility δi() of the i-th agent is δi(S) = σi(S), where
σi(S) =
∑
A
Pr[A|S] · σi(A) (4)
4Ideally decisions should be made in polynomial time.
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is the expected number of Ci-active nodes under S and σi(A)
is the expected number of Ci-active nodes under A. Such a
game is called rumor-oblivious game. In the following, we
will show that the rumor-oblivious game also forms a valid
utility system. However, the proof slightly differs from that of
the rumor-aware game.
Lemma 4. The rumor-oblivious game is a valid utility system
under the PIC model.
Proof. See Appendix A-F.
We have the following result due to Vetta [27]
Corollary 2. For any Nash equilibrium S of the rumor-
oblivious game, γ(S) ≥ ( 12 )·γ(Ω), where Ω is the full-strategy
maximizing γ().
As discussed in prior works e.g. [16], given the actions of
other agents, σi(A) is also monotone and submodular with
respect to the seed set of the i-th agent. Therefore, similar to
the analysis in Sec. IV-C, the agents in the rumor-oblivious
game are also able to make the (1 − 1/e)-approximate pure
response. However, unlike the rumor-aware game, there may
not be a 2·e−1e−1 -approximation equilibrium for the rumor-
oblivious game. This is because the pure Nash equilibrium
may not exist in the rumor-oblivious game.
V. DISCUSSIONS ON
CASCADE PRIORITY AND ACTIVATION ORDER
In this section, we provide several observations concerning
the competitive diffusion model. The discussion herein may
help us further understand the scenario when more than two
cascades exist. We introduce this following two types of
cascade priority.
Definition 11 (Homogeneous & Heterogeneous Cascade Pri-
ority). The cascade priority is homogeneous if the priority of
the cascades is the same for each user. Otherwise, it is called
heterogeneous cascade priority.
We list some observations, as follows.
Fact 1. Under the homogeneous cascade priority, if rumor
does not have the highest priority, γ(A) is not a set function
anymore.
An example.. Consider the network shown in Fig. 2a and 2b,
where pGe = 1 for each edge e. Suppose ar = {v2} and
there are two agents with cascades C1 and C2, respectively.
Suppose that Priority(C1) ≤ Priority(Cr) ≤ Priority(C2).
One can easily check that action A1 = ({v1}, {v3}) and
A2 = ({v3}, {v1}) result different values of social utility.
Under action A1, v4 will be activated by the rumor seed v2
and therefore many nodes will be later activated by rumor
spreading from v4. However, under A2, only the node v2 will
be activated by rumor as v4 will be activated by cascade C1.
Thus, γ(A1) 6= γ(A2) even if A∗1 = A∗2.
Fact 2. Under the heterogeneous cascade priority, the social
utility γ(A) is not monotone increasing.
v2
v3v4
v1
a r
C1
C 2
Rumor-activated node
(a) Action A1.
v2
v3v4
v1
a r
C 2
C1
(b) Action A2.
v3
v5v1
v 2
v4
(c) Second example.
v3
v1
v 2
v4
v5
(d) Third example.
Fig. 2: Examples.
An example.. The heterogeneous cascade priority setting has
been adopted in prior works e.g. [17]. We observe that under
this setting, the social utility may decrease when more agents
join in game. Consider the illustrative example shown in Fig.
2c, where each pGe = 1 for each edge e and ar = {v3}.
Suppose there are two agents C1 and C2, and for v4 and v5,
the priority of the cascades is
Priority(C2) < Priority(C1) < Priority(Cr)
and
Priority(C1) ≤ Priority(Cr) ≤ Priority(C2),
respectively. Consider two actions A1 and A2 where A1 =
({v1}, ∅) and A2 = ({v1}, {v2}). Under A1 there is only one
agent in the game and v5 will be activated by C1 because C1
has the higher priority than Cr at v5. However, when another
agent joins the game as shown by A2, v5 will become Cr-
active because v4 will be activated by C2 and Priority(Cr) ≤
Priority(C2) at v4. Therefore, under this setting, γ(A) may
not be monotone increasing with respect to A∗.
Fact 3. Under the homogeneous cascade priority, if an active
user only attempts to activate inactive neighbors, the social
utility γ(A) is not monotone increasing.
An example.. Note that we in this paper assume that a node
may try to activate the neighbor that has been active. It is
worthy to note that if each node only attempts to activate
inactive neighbors, then γ(A) is not monotone increasing
under the PIC model. An example is shown in Fig. 2d.
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Again we assume that each edge has the probability of 1,
ar = {v2} and there are two agents. Suppose each node only
selects inactive node to activate and v4 will activate v1 and
v5 in order after becoming active. Consider the two actions
A1 = ({v3}, ∅) and A2 = ({v3}, {v1}). One can see that
v5 will be activated by C1 under A1 because at the second
step v4 will activate v1 after rumored by v2. Nevertheless, if
another agent participates and selects v1 as the seed node, as
shown in A2, then v5 will be rumor-activated by v4, because
at the second step v4 will not try to activate v1 as v1 has been
activated in the first step. Thus, when more agents come to
limit the spread of rumor, the rumor may surprisingly spread
more widely.
As shown above, under certain settings the model does
not have good properties anymore and consequently, the
rumor blocking problem becomes more complicated in such
scenarios.
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the rumor
blocking effect in the equilibrium of the proposed game by
comparing it with the traditional rumor blocking framework
where there is only one positive cascade. We first simulate
the behavior of the agents to obtain the seed nodes, and then
simulate the diffusion process to see how many users will be
influenced by rumor.
A. Setup
Our experiments are performed on a server with 16 GB ram
and a 3.6 GHz quadcore processor running 64-bit JAVA VM
1.6.
1) Dataset: We adopt the network structure of the fol-
lowing datasets. The first dataset, denoted by Facebook, is
collected from the Facebook social platform, provided by
SNAP [29]. The Facebook dataset contains 4,039 nodes with
88,234 edges and it has been widely used in prior works
[30]–[32]. Another real-world social network is an academic
collaboration from co-authorships in physics, denoted by Hep.
This dataset is compiled from the “High Energy Physics-
Theory” section of the e-print arXiv5, including about 15,000
nodes and 58,000 edges. Hep dataset has been studied in [15],
[33], [34] and [35].
2) Propagation Probability: In the experiments, we con-
sider three settings of the probability on the edges. In the first
and second settings, the probability of each edge is uniformly
set as 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. The third setting follows the
classic weighted cascade model [15] where pG(u,v) = 1/dv and
dv is the number of out-neighbors of node v.
3) Seeds of Rumor: The seed nodes of rumor are selected
from the nodes with the highest degree. The number of the
rumor seeds will be discussed later.
4) The Game: Given a social network and budget k, we
deploy k agents each of which generates one positive cascade
with one seed node. The seed nodes are obtained by simulating
the Simple Game developed in Sec. IV. The diffusion result
of the Simple Game is labeled as Game.
5http://www.arXiv.org
5) Single-positive-cascade case.: For the single-positive-
cascade case, we set the budget of the seed set as k and
select the seed nodes of the positive cascade according to the
following methods.
• Greedy. This is the state-of-the-art rumor blocking al-
gorithm. Given a budget k, we assume there is one
positive cascade with k seed nodes in which the nodes
are decided by successively adding the node that can
maximize the social value. Such a method provides a
(1− 1/e)-approximation due to the submodularity and it
has been wildly used in the prior works [3]–[5].
• MaxDegree. Assuming there is one positive cascade,
MaxDegree selects the k users in V \ar with the highest
degree.
• Random. Assuming there is one positive cascade, Ran-
dom selects k seed nodes at random.
• NoBlocking. This is the case when there is no positive
cascade.
Another popular heuristic rumor blocking algorithm, called
Proximity, which selects the neighbor of rumor seed nodes as
positive seed nodes, is not included in our experiments because
its performance is worse than that of Greedy as shown in
[5] and [3]. Due to space limitation, we will not discuss all
combinations of the above settings. For a given full-action (i.e.,
the seed sets of each cascade) and a specified network, γ(A)
is calculated by taking the average of 10,000 simulations.
B. Results
We perform three series of experiments. The experimental
results are discussed as follows.
1) Experiment I: In the first experiment, the number of
seed nodes of the rumor is set from 1 to 30 and the budget
k is equal to the number of rumor seed nodes. The results
of this experiment on Facebook under the three propagation
probability settings are shown in Figs. 3a, 3b and 3c. As shown
in the figures, when the propagation probability is 0.01, the
effectiveness of Game is slightly worse than that of Greedy.
Under the other two settings of propagation probability, the
equilibrium of the game has the same degree of effect as
Greedy does in limiting the spread of the rumor. The result
of this experiment done on Hep is shown in Fig. 3d. In
this case, Game provides the best performance among all the
considered methods. In general, both of the Game and Greedy
are effective for rumor containment. However, under different
settings and network structures, the patterns of the curves are
diverse. The first observation is that the spread of rumor may
have a saturation point with respect to the number of seed
nodes. For the cases shown in Figs. 3a and 3b, the number of
Cr-active nodes under NoBlocking will not notably increase
when k is larger than 5. Nevertheless, in Fig. 3d, the number
of Cr-active nodes continuously increases with the increase
of k. Another observation is that when k increases by one,
the number of Cr-active nodes does not necessarily increase.
As shown in Fig. 3c, when one rumor seed and one agent are
added at k = 15, the number of Cr-active nodes decreases
by about 500 under Game. Such a case suggests that the
marginal effect of adding one seed node not only depends
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Fig. 3: Results of the first experiment. The y-axis and x-axis denote the expected number of Cr-active nodes and the number
of rumor seed nodes, respectively. Each graph gives five curves plotting the number of Cr-active nodes under NoBlocking,
Game, Greedy, MaxDegree, and Random, respectively.
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Fig. 4: Results of the second experiment. The y-axis and x-axis denote the expected number of Cr-active nodes and the number
of rumor seed nodes, respectively. Each graph gives five curves plotting the number of Cr-active nodes under NoBlocking,
Game, Greedy, MaxDegree, and Random, respectively.
on the selection of the seed nodes but also on the network
structure.
2) Experiment II: In the second experiment, we fix the
number of rumor seed nodes and see how the number of Cr-
active nodes varies with the increase of the budget k. The
results of the experiments under three different settings are
shown as Figs. 4a, 4b and 4c. One can see that when more
budget is added the number of Cr-active nodes become less
and less. On the Facebook network, when pG(u,v) is equal to
0.1 and |ar| is set as 20, as shown in Fig. 4a, the number
of Cr-active nodes decreases significantly under Game and
Greedy but hardly changes under MaxDegree and Random,
which implies that the agent should not arbitrarily select
seed nodes or use simple heuristics. For the case shown in
Fig. 4c, one can see that adding the first positive seed node
can reduce the number of Cr-active nodes by a half. Such
a scenario answers the submodularity nature of the rumor
blocking problem and indicates that the first several actions
of the agents are important.
3) Experiment III: In the third experiment, we fix both the
number of rumor seeds and budget k, and record the number of
Cr-active nodes round by round. That is, we take the snapshots
of the first two experiments and examine how fast the rumor
spread under different cases. The results are shown in Figs. 5a,
5b and 5c. As indicated by the figures, the equilibrium of the
game formulated in this paper can effectively limit the spread
of the rumor. Furthermore, under appropriate strategies, the
rumor can be blocked at an early stage. For example, in Fig.
5b, the number of Cr-active nodes stops increasing at about
the eighth round under Game. However, it increases until the
eleventh round under MaxDegree.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we study the rumor blocking problem when
there are multiple positive cascades. By formulating the rumor-
aware game and the rumor-oblivious game, we have shown the
that under the best-response and the approximate-response, the
equilibrium the game provides a 2-approximation and 2e+1e+1 -
approximation, respectively, with respect to the social utility,
i.e., the number of nodes that are not influenced by rumor. The
theoretical results herein are well supported by the experiments
done on real-world networks.
As shown in this paper, the rumor containment in a dis-
tributed mode is effective for rumor blocking. Therefore, it is
interesting to design rumor blocking strategies for multiple
positive cascades with the concern of the cascade priority.
Another direction of the future work is to study the pure
Nash equilibrium of the rumor-oblivious game. In particular,
it is interesting to study the circumstance under which the
pure Nash equilibrium exists. Finally, as discussed in Sec. V,
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Fig. 5: Results of the third experiment. The y-axis and x-axis denote the expected number of Cr-active nodes and the index
of spread round, respectively. Each graph gives five curves plotting the number of Cr-active nodes under NoBlocking, Game,
Greedy, MaxDegree and Random, respectively.
the competitive cascade model becomes evasive under certain
settings. To the best our knowledge, none of the prior works
has considered the rumor blocking problem in such models.
We leave this part for the future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For each cascade C, we denote by Ct be the set of
C-active nodes after time step t. Now let us consider the
spreading result after time step t + 1. To prove the theorem,
it is sufficient to show that given the Ct, for each cascade C,
and btu for each u at time step t, the distributions of the spread
result after time step t+ 1 are the same under the two spread
processes. In particular, because the cascade priorities are the
same under the both process, it suffices to prove that, for any
inactive node u∗ and any active node v∗, the probability that
v∗ successfully actives u∗ at time step t + 1 under the first
spreading process is the same as that under the second one.
Process a. An active node v∗ successfully activates the
inactive node u∗ at time step t+ 1 if and only if u∗ ∈ btv∗ , v∗
select u∗ to activate and the activation is successful. By Def.
3, this probability is p(v∗,u∗)|bt
v∗ |
.
Process b. According to Def. 4, v∗ will try to activate u∗
at time step t+1 if and only if αgv∗(u
∗) = dv∗ −|btv∗ |+1 and
pg(v∗,u∗) = 1. Since each permutation has the same probability
to be generated, for each node u ∈ btv∗ , αgv∗(u) = dv∗−|btv∗ |+
1 happens with the same probability. Therefore, for the node
u∗, with the probability of 1|bt
v∗ |
, v∗ will try to activate u∗
at time step t + 1. Thus, under this process, that probability
that v∗ successfully activates u∗ at time step t + 1 is still
p(v∗,u∗)
|bt
v∗ |
.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
We introduce some preliminaries before proving Lemma. 1.
For a fixed realization g and a full-action A = (a1, ..., ak), the
outcome of the influence diffusion in g under A is determined.
Let tgA(u) be the time that u becomes active in g under A.
Lemma 5. For two nodes u1 and u2, and any simple path P =
(v1 = u1, ..., vi, ..., vm = u2) from u1 to u2 in g, t
g
A(u2) ≤
tgA(u1) + |P | where |P | is the sum of the weights of the edges
in P .
Proof. For any two successive node vi and vi+1 in the path,
vi will attempt to activate vi+1 at t
g
A(vi) + w
g(vi, vi+1).
Therefore, tgA(vi+1) ≤ tgA(vi) + wg(vi, vi+1). The property
follows inductively from u1 to u2 along the given path.
Corollary 3. Given a realization g and a full-action A, for
any node u and v where v is a seed selected by one or more
cascades, tgA(u) ≤ disg(v, u).
Proof. Since v is a seed node, tgA(u) = 0. The corollary
directly follows from Lemma 5.
The next lemma provides the condition for a node u to be
rumor-activated in a realization g under a full-action A.
Lemma 6. Given a full-action A = (a1, ..., ak) and a real-
ization g, a node u∗ will be activated by rumor Cr in g under
process b defined in Theorem 1⇔ disg(ar, u∗) ≤ disg(ai, u∗)
for each i and disg(ar, u∗) 6= +∞6.
Proof. Let vi be the node in ai such that disg(vi, u∗) =
disg(ai, u
∗), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
⇒: Clearly, disg(ar, u∗) 6= +∞. Since u∗ is activated by
rumor, there is path P from a certain node vr ∈ ar to u∗
such that all the nodes in this path are activated by rumor
and tgA(u
∗) = |P |. By definition, disg(ar, u∗) ≤ |P |. By
Corollary 3, tgA(u
∗) ≤ disg(vi, u∗) for each i, which implies
disg(ar, u
∗) ≤ |P | = tgA(u∗) ≤ disg(vi, u∗).
⇐: Now suppose disg(ar, u∗) ≤ disg(ai, u∗) for each i
and disg(ar, u∗) 6= +∞. Let vr be the node in ar such that
disg(vr, u
∗) = disg(ar, u∗) and P be the shortest path from
vr to u∗ in g. Suppose the nodes in P are u1, ..., ul where
u1 = vr and ul = u∗. It suffices to show that every node uj
in P will be activated by rumor at time disg(u1, uj). We prove
this inductively. Clearly, tgA(u1) = dis
g(u1, u1) = 0 and u1 is
6We define that disg(u1, u2) = disg(u3, u4) if disg(u1, u2) = +∞ and
disg(u3, u4) = +∞, for any four nodes u1, u2, u3 and u4.
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activated by rumor. Suppose this is true for the first j nodes in
P and uj+1 is activated by its certain in-neighbor v∗. There
are two cases shown as follows.
Case 1: v∗ = uj . By the inductive hypothesis uj is activated
by rumor at time disg(u1, uj). Therefore, vj+1 is also activated
by rumor and
tgA(uj+1) = t
g
A(uj) + w
g(uj , uj+1)
= disg(u1, uj) + w
g(uj , uj+1) = dis
g(u1, uj+1).
Case 2: v∗ 6= uj . Suppose v∗ is activated at tgA(v∗) via a
certain path P
′
from a certain seed node v
′
to v∗. Then, uj+1
is activated at |P |′ + wg(v∗, uj+1). By Corollary 3,
|P |′ + wg(v∗, uj+1) = tgA(uj+1) ≤ disg(u1, uj+1). (5)
Furthermore, since disg(u1, u∗) = disg(ar, u∗) ≤
disg(ai, u
∗), disg(u1, uj+1) ≤ disg(vi, uj+1) for each i. Since
P
′
together with (v∗, uj+1) is a path from v
′
to uj+1,
disg(u1, uj+1) ≤ |P ′ |+ wg(v∗, uj+1). Combining Eq.(5),
disg(u1, uj+1) = |P
′ |+ wg(v∗, vi+1) = tgA(vj+1).
By the inductive hypothesis, uj is Cr-active at disg(v1, uj)
and it will attempt to activate uj+1 at disg(v1, uj) +
wg(uj , uj+1) = dis
g(u1, uj+1), which means uj and v∗
activate uj+1 at the same time. Since the rumor has the
highest priority, uj+1 will be activated by rumor at time step
disg(u1, uj+1). By the above induction, all the nodes in path
P , including u∗, are Cr-active.
One can see that the minimum of disg(ai, u∗) only depends
on the union of the positive seed sets and therefore the social
utility is a set function, shown as follows.
Proof of Lemma 1. It suffices to show that, for any realiza-
tion g and two full actions A1 and A2, γg(A1) = γg(A2) if
A∗1 = A
∗
2. Let u be an arbitrary Cr-active node in g under
A1 = (a1, ..., ak). By Lemma 6, disg(ar, u) > disg(ai, u)
for some i or disg(ar, u) = ∞. If disg(ar, u) = ∞, then
there is no path from any rumor seed to u and therefore u
cannot be activated by rumor in g under A2. Now suppose
disg(ar, u) 6=∞ and disg(ar, u) > disg(vi, u) for some i and
some vi ∈ ai. Since A∗1 = A∗2, vi must be a seed node of
some agent i∗ in A2 and therefore disg(ar, u) < disg(ai∗ , u),
which means u is also Cr-active in g under A2. By the
above analysis, γg(A1) ≤ γg(A2). It can be easily seen that
γg(A2) ≤ γg(A1) can be proved in the similar manner, and
therefore γg(A1) = γg(A2).
C. Proof of Lemma 2
By Theorem 1, we only need to show that γg() is monotone
increasing and submodular for each realization g. Due to
Lemma 6, γg() is clearly monotone increasing. To prove the
submodularity, it suffices to show that, for each realization g,
γg(X ∪ {v})− γg(X) ≥ γg(Y ∪ {v})− γg(Y ), (6)
where X ⊆ Y ⊆ V and v ∈ V \ Y . Since γg() is monotone
increasing, γg(Y ∪ {v})− γg(Y ) is the number of nodes that
are Cr-active under Y but Cr-active under Y ∪ {v}. Now
let us consider such a node u. Since u is Cr-active under
Y ∪ {v}, disg(ar, u) 6= +∞. By Lemma 6, disg(ar, u) ≤
disg(Y, u) and disg(ar, u) > disg(Y ∪ {v}, u), which means
disg(ar, u) > dis
g({v}, u). Because X is a subset of Y ,
disg(X,u) ≥ disg(Y, u) ≥ disg(ar, u) and thus u will be
Cr-active in g under X . Meanwhile, u cannot be Cr-active in
g under X ∪ {v} because disg(X ∪ {v}, u) ≤ disg({v}, u) <
disg(ar, u). Therefore, each node that contributes 1 to the
right-hand side of Eq. (6) must contribute 1 to the left-hand
side. Eq. (6) thus follows.
D. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By the definition of δi(·), Eq. (2) directly follows. Let
δgi (A) = γ
g(A)− γg(A(i, ∅)). To prove Eq. (3), it suffices to
show that
∑k
i=1 δ
g
i (A) ≤ γg(A) holds for each full-action A
and g. Note that
k∑
i=1
δgi (A)
=
k∑
i=1
γg(A)− γg(A(i, ∅))
=
k∑
i=1
γg(Ak)− γg(Ak(i, ∅))
{By Corollary 2}
≤
k∑
i=1
γg(Ai)− γg(Ai(i, ∅))
= γg(Ak) = γg(A).
Thus, proved.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Suppose Ω = (b1, ..., bk). For two node sets V1 and
V2, we denote by V V21 the set of the nodes in V1 but not in
V2, i.e., V V21 = V1 − V2. Under such notation, A∗ ∪ Ω∗ =
A∗ ∪ bA∗1 ∪, ...,∪bA
∗
k . Let Bi = {bA
∗
1 , ..., b
A∗
i } and B0 = {∅}.
Then
γ(A∗ ∪ Ω∗)− γ(A∗)
=
k∑
i=1
γ(A∗ ∪B∗i )− γ(A∗ ∪B∗i−1).
Due to submodularity, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
γ(A∗ ∪B∗i )− γ(A∗ ∪B∗i−1)
≤ γ(A∗ ∪ bA∗i )− γ(A∗)
≤ γ(A∗ − ai ∪ bA∗i )− γ(A∗ − ai)
According to the monotonicity of γ(),
γ(A∗ − ai ∪ bA∗i ) ≤ γ(A∗ − ai ∪ bi).
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Therefore,
γ(A∗ ∪ Ω∗)− γ(A∗)
≤
k∑
i=1
γ(A∗ − ai ∪ bA∗i )− γ(A∗ − ai)
≤
k∑
i=1
γ(A∗ − ai ∪ bi)− γ(A∗ − ai) (7)
{by the approximate response}
≤
k∑
i=1
(1− e−1)−1 · δi(A∗)
{by Eq. (3)}
≤ (1− e−1)−1 · γ(A∗). (8)
Thus, proved.
F. Proof of Lemma 4
Let σgi (A) be the number of Ci-active nodes in g, By
Theorem 1,
σi(A) =
∑
g∈G
Pr[g] · σgi (A),
and therefore, in order to prove Eq. (2), it suffices to show
that σgi (A) ≥ γg(A) − γg(A(i, ∅)) holds for each full-action
A and each realization g. Note that γg(A) is a set function
on A∗ and it is monotonically increasing. Therefore, the right-
hand side is number of nodes that are Cr-active under A but
Cr-active under A(i, ∅). Let u be such a node that contribute
1 to the right-hand side. According to Lemma 6, disg(ai, u) <
disg(ar, u) ≤ disg(aj , u) for j 6= i. Thus, u must be Ci-active
under A in g and therefore also contributes 1 to the left-hand
side. Eq. (2) thus proved.
Now to prove Eq. (3), it suffices to show that
∑k
i=1 δ
g
i (A) ≤
γg(A) holds for each A and g. Note that γg(A) is the number
of Cr-active nodes, i.e., the nodes activated by the positive
cascades together with the nodes that are not activated by any
cascade. Therefore, Eq. (3) follows directly.
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